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Without any doubt, the last seven decades in Europe have been a time 
of unprecedented peace and prosperity for a continent with a long his-
tory of bloodshed. Moreover, after the last enlargements, the European 
Union [EU] has strengthened its unification, from East to West, in a 
quasi-continental Union, and it is therefore no longer abusive to identify 
the EU with Europe. Indeed, building Europe is a choice of civilization 
and, as such, of values: before the threat of a selfish, intolerant and glo-
balized world, submitted to standardizing scores and market forces, 
producing exclusion on a global scale, Europe’s calling is to state a 
model of society which is founded upon human rights, the coexistence 
of differences, of tolerance, of solidarity. According to the Treaties, the 
EU is founded “on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (Article 
6 TEU); if there is a risk of a serious breach of these principles by a 
member state, some of its membership rights can be suspended. It is in 
order to promote this model of society both in and outside of Europe 
that Europe unites: one social and ecological economy, one currency, 
one external and defense policy, common institutions.
Jacques Delors said, “Just as one does not fall in love with growth 
rate, one does not fall in love with the great market, with the economic 
and monetary Union, nor even with the world order. Now, without 
power, Europe cannot be generous” (Delors, 1993: 8). The question of 
Husserl (1935) continues to urge us: “the spiritual features of Europe, 
what does this mean?” According to Jaspers, three concepts allow “to 
build the scheme of what specifically belongs to Europe: freedom, his-
tory, science.” It is this truly cosmopolitical design we will seek to show 
in this reflection, in six steps.
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1. The European construction, a task in fieri…
The European construction is a task in fieri: in it prevail the small steps 
once suggested by Jean Monnet, which today regain their purpose, and 
which were the essence of the “Community method”. By clearing a 
step, the EU starts a new one; by finishing andamenti, it intercalates 
intermezzi, now and then seeming plunged in severe crisis, as is cur-
rently the crisis of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean 
towards Europe. There is, therefore, no EU without a process; the EU, 
a story of stories, is always the beginning of a beginning, stepping on 
a “long march”, where now the “will of all”, now the “general will” is 
predominant – to use, by transposing it to this reality, Rousseau’s clas-
sical conceptualization.
In fact, we are in the course of inventing new instruments of politi-
cal action with a projection that is different from that of the Nation-
state. This was unarguably the most creative invention of the modern 
era, but the Nation-state’s power is the first victim of globalization: its 
political sovereignty was based on the association of the political, mil-
itary and cultural sovereignties, but the three pillars of this reality are 
now adrift… Today we realize its separation and its possible divorce: 
the power was diluted from the top of the Nation-state, sparse in the 
extra-territoriality, which the instruments of action of the Nation-state 
can no longer reach. There is, therefore, on the one hand, no power 
without politics (a power unchecked by politics), and on the other, no 
politics without power (politics deprived of the power which could ren-
der it effective). The States “have simply become the spectators of the 
global economy”. Now, matters left to themselves tend to separate, not 
unite – as the history of the EU itself testifies.
Apart from their economical dimension, the countries of the EU are 
already united in a network of institutional and legal, social, cultural 
and political relations, the complexity and magnitude of which will in 
the coming years continue to grow, as more European countries inte-
grate the EU and the community institutions broaden the scope of their 
work (Etzioni, 2001: xxiv-xxxi). Significant progress has indeed been 
made, perhaps too much for some, in the process of European integra-
tion, which until now has carried advantages for all. It is however 
EUROPEISM AND “COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY” | 15
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL VALUES | VOLUME II | NÚMERO 1 | JUN. 2019
possible for the European ground to be more unstable than we imagine. 
This is probably due first of all to the global economy being character-
ized, and becoming even more so in the future, by both the instability 
of financial markets and trading agreements, and by the integration of 
social, national, cultural and ecological demands.
There is no Messiah to order Europe to “rise and walk”. To the hege-
monic Europe of the 18th and 19th centuries, Humanism, Reason, Sci-
ence, played the role of a Messiah; but the truths of Humanism, Reason 
and Science, have become fallacious as soon as they became messianic; 
it therefore matters to safeguard the humanism, the reason, the science, 
withdrawing from it any messianic mission or duty (Morin, 1998: 77). 
The way things are going, it will take several generations for the EU to 
constitute a political Europe, with an external and a defense policy of 
its own, without replicating any of the currently existing federations 
of the world.
Both Cosmopolitism and Europeism share the ability to overcome 
the inability of Nation-states, the balancing of market forces and the 
mastering of the effects of globalization. Jean Monnet, at the end of his 
memoirs, declared “the sovereign nations of the past can no longer 
solve the problems of the present. And the [European] Community 
itself is nothing but a stage for the organization forms of tomorrow’s 
world” (Monnet, 1976: 617). The political Europe will not be a mere 
extension of the economical Europe, of the Europe of interests. There 
is still plenty to create, and it is not too helpful to think in the image of 
the federal model, be it that of the United States, Canada, Germany, or 
any other. The reason is simple: in these cases, the federal State is a 
national State; in Europe’s case, that instance is supranational – some-
thing so far unknown.
2. Preserving both the freedom and diversity of the peoples
According to Kant, the idea of a “perpetual peace” contains the char-
acteristic traces of a “regulating idea”, that is to say, of a “task to be 
performed”: it means one can act as if it were possible to establish it, 
taking it as guidance for our actions and as a criterion to judge real 
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situations. Inasmuch as it opens up to a “horizon of hope” and marks 
a task for humanity, it must be understood as an ethical-political proj-
ect. However, each of the three “definitive articles” of Zum ewigen Frie-
den [“For the Perpetual Peace”] shape one of the three legal levels, 
which are necessary to the attainment of perpetual peace. Thus, accord-
ing to the first, which states that “the civil constitution of every state 
shall be republican” (Kant, 1795: 99), that is to say, shall be democratic, 
if one wishes to understand the Kantian expression in its current mean-
ing: “Republicanism is that political principle whereby the executive 
power (the government) is separated from the legislative power. Des-
potism prevails in a state if the laws are made and arbitrarily executed 
by one and the same power, and it reflects the will of the people only 
in so far as the ruler treats the will of the people as his own private 
will.” (ib., 101). If many, both before and after Kant, did not relate the 
peace issue with the form of government, Kant, on the contrary, is 
intimately convinced of a meaningful bond between the States’ internal 
structure and their bellicist or pacifist tendencies, taking a keen interest 
in the analysis of the “best political regime”.
Furthermore, the second “definitive article” – “the right of nations 
shall be based on a federation of free states” (Kant, 1795: 102) – assumes 
the end of the “state of nature” between States and the emergence of a 
sort of federative contract. Correcting Hobbes, Rousseau sustained that 
“there is no war among men, there is only war among States”; but he 
seemed uncertain on this matter, and did not clarify how to overcome 
the “state of nature” between States. On the other hand, according to 
Kant and to Montesquieu (half a century before), it is the “Federative 
Republic”, defined as “a society of societies”, which should be achieved; 
the examples mentioned in The Spirit of Laws (IX, 1) – the Greek and 
Roman confederations, but also those of the Netherlands, Germany 
and Switzerland – seem eloquent to him.
Stepping away from Rousseau, Kant signaled that general and per-
petual peace was a contractual creation, the fruit of a foedum pacificum: 
“reason, as the highest legislative moral power, absolutely condemns 
war as a test of rights and sets up peace as an immediate duty. How-
ever, peace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without a general 
agreement between the nations; thus a particular kind of league, which 
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we might call a pacific federation (foedus pacificum), is required. It would 
differ from a peace treaty (pactum pacis) in that the latter terminates one 
war, whereas the former would seek to end all wars for good” (Kant, 
1795: 104). On the one hand, Kant probably considered that the demand 
of a world republic, the ultimate though not realistic ideal, would mean 
to place his suggestions alongside dreams (whether those of Saint-
Pierre or Rousseau); but, on the other hand, the despotic course of the 
French Revolution would have broken the Kantian optimism.
In this way, not only does it surpass the notion of a “peace treaty”, 
characteristic of traditional international law (which implies only a 
temporary absence of war), but seeks a lasting peace thanks to a “pacific 
federation” (Friedensbund). Moving further and further away from a 
“world State” (Weltstaat) – so he thought still in his text from 1784, Idea 
for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose –, Kant advocates, in 
1795, a federation of free States. If a world State would be a solution to 
conflicts, it might become a threat to individual freedoms; from the 
“positive idea” of a world republic one reaches the “negative equivalent” 
of a lasting alliance – as a federation of free, sovereign, equal States –, 
which would ensure a peace preserving both the freedom and diversity 
of the peoples.
However, one of the most original novelties of the Kantian text was 
his tripartition of the legal order, by including a new kind of right 
beside the traditional binary partition in internal and external public 
right, which he calls jus cosmopoliticum – “cosmopolitan right shall be 
limited to conditions of universal hospitality” (Kant, 1795, 105). Of the 
three definitive articles in Perpetual Peace, the first, according to which 
every State’s constitution should be republican, belongs to internal 
public right; the second, according to which international right should 
be based on a federation of free States, belongs to external public right; 
the third corresponds to a so far unheard kind.
Kant signals that, besides from the relations between the State and 
its citizens, and between the State and other States, must also be con-
sidered the relations between any State and the citizens of other States. 
In this relation of reciprocity between the foreign citizen’s right to visit 
and the visited State’s duty of hospitality, Kant had originally prefig-
ured the right of every man to be a citizen, not only of a State, but of 
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the world: “The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying 
degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point 
where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. 
Therefore, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is not bizarre and over 
strained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political 
and international law, transforming it into a universal law of humanity. 
Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are contin-
ually advancing towards a perpetual peace” (Kant, 1795: 107-108).
The “cosmopolitan right”, prefigured in the stoic theme of the civitas 
maxima, and prolonging the ancient right Francisco de Vitoria attributed 
to all people of being entitled to access everywhere in the world and to 
the peaceful coexistence of the several nations in a totus orbis, laid the 
foundations for a new world order. In the dawn of the 21st century, 
these reflexions possess a striking actuality, in the strengthening of the 
European construction. However, the moment contingency and inter-
dependence of legal entities are such that “a violation of rights in one 
part of the world is felt everywhere”, cosmopolitical right must unite 
with state (and international) right: there is, therefore, a complementa-
rity between national (and international) right and cosmopolitanism.
Nowadays, when the State is becoming less and less the master of 
its sovereignty and a “shared sovereignty” is emerging gradually, the 
vigor of the ideas expressed by Kant in 1795 becomes visible, impreg-
nating the real through that ideal which lay dormant in it. The consti-
tution of an international order as an imperious necessity is not only 
about the inclusion of commerce – “for the spirit of commerce sooner or 
later takes hold of every people, and it cannot exist side by side with 
war” (Kant, 1795: 114) –, nor only about economic relations, but about 
a political interdependence.
It is also important to clarify that other note of Kantian “cosmopo-
litical right”. It is a conception that adds in subsidium (Cheneval, 2003: 
200-204) to state right and the people’s right: cosmopolitanism is a third 
dimension of modern States and not a new superior substantial unity 
that replaces or destroys them; it is, then, of a relational and interactive 
nature. The national State no longer fulfills its cosmopolitical dimen-
sion in an auto-generating and solipsist way, somewhat like the right 
to resist and the right of non-commitment of an individual towards the 
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State, whose legitimacy diminishes as the State gradually comes to 
respect human rights and configures itself democratically. Then, con-
sidering the cosmopolitical situation an evaluation criterion, national 
democracy and everything which is merely national is simply not 
enough: cosmopolitanism is fulfilled through the integration of the 
Nation-state into a network of cosmopolitical right, through political 
relational commitments, in interaction with other States, this reciproc-
ity constituting a third structure, subsidiary but relatively autonomous.
3. The solution lies not in “less Europe”, but in “more Europe”
From the social inductivism reaped from the European adventure, one 
can infer that the solution lies not in “less Europe”, but in “more 
Europe”. It does not suffice, as has been attempted in the Treaties of 
Maastricht or Amsterdam or Lisbon, to simply add that which has 
meanwhile been done, making corrections and improvements. It is 
necessary for a new democratic atmosphere to penetrate the interstices 
of a eurocratic EU, for the statute of a European citizenship to develop, 
for the dynamic between nations and regions to develop.
The cosmopolitical dimension, which is subsidiary, is of a processual 
nature, and therefore post-metaphysical and non-essentialist: the 
deconstruction of the substantiality of the Nation-state does not destroy 
the State as such; it rather undoes the theoretical obstacle which blocks 
it in relation to admission commitments in a cosmopolitical political 
structure with other States. This is obviously not some kind of revolu-
tion that radically questions the legitimacy of the Nation-state, pointing 
to a new cosmopolitical legitimacy. To think in such a way would mean, 
on the one hand, not to abandon the metaphysics which is applied to 
the national logic of the state, which, on the other hand, one also wishes 
to transpose to other levels. One must not, therefore, seek the paradigm 
of the “Europe in the making” – as do many politologists – in the 
national unity of the United States or of any other typically federal 
State: the Nation-state is not the future of Europe, but its past; it is not 
the end, but the beginning, in the sense that therein lie the foundations 
from whence European construction emerged. It is an old error of 
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political thought, already criticized by Aristotle, to glimpse the supe-
rior unity of political integration according to the model of its compo-
nent unities; in his Politics (Book II, 1261a1-1261b15), Aristotle contended 
with Plato in the sense that the polis was neither a family nor a village. 
The EU shall not be a sovereign Nation-state: it does include but trans-
forms Member States (Cheneval, 2003: 197-198).
Now, cosmopolitism does not present itself as an applied metaphys-
ics which generates a new substantial form of the state; it is instead a 
processual logic owed to an end in itself – humanity. That is an ideal in 
the sense Kant meant it, i.e., it is a part of history only as the aim of an 
approximation process: no real institution identifies with that ideal. In 
this sense, one can say that the era of the absolute Nation-state has 
ended. This does not put into question the principle of the rule of law; 
instead, it simply represents the State (Zustand) as the most recent of 
democratic political forms, which are accepted and legitimate. In fact, 
in Europe, such as the States have not destroyed the cities, but inte-
grated them, so will the EU now do the same to States and Regions 
themselves (Rocha, 2003: 208-211).
Right in its cosmopolitical dimension must be understood, as Kant 
suggests, as a gradual political and democratic integration process. The 
modern State is therefore enlisted in the cosmopolitical imperative of 
committing to a democratic construction of the post-national society 
(Cheneval, 2003: 203; Habermas, 1998: 58; Ferry, 2000: 52-60). In this 
context, the republican notion of a people changes: it is no longer a 
moral macro-subject, hermetically closed upon itself by the quasi-sub-
stantiality of the social contract, but all those who, according to a regime 
reciprocally created between peoples, choose to live together. The 
unfolding horizon congregates that moral body with those from other 
countries, that is to say, from all those who choose to and can integrate 
in a civic way.
One of the contributions of Michel Foucault – whose research dis-
closes the pertinence of an analysis of the “microphysics of power” – is 
to have shown that an efficacious exercise of power relies not so much 
upon military force or dissuasion techniques as on the legitimacy in 
the application of common norms. The implication is that any exami-
nation of democracy needs to take into account both the political 
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arrangements that protect the rights of citizens and enable them to 
exercise these rights and the normalizing mechanisms of power that 
foster certain abilities and ensure their submission among these citi-
zens. In other words, “there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge that does presuppose and consti-
tute at the same time power relations” (Foucault, 1975: 36). In this 
sense, Europeans believe that the key to their success lies on their vig-
ilance being voluntary and mutual, no giant disciplinary machinery 
being needed to ensure their observance. European integration proves 
to be no failure in this area; it is in fact the most successful historical 
example of cooperation between old sovereign States: almost 70% of 
all legislation regulating the daily life of Europeans has its origin in the 
EU. The “Community method” has managed to create a common inter-
est, which integrates national interests, through solidarity and interde-
pendence; in the present situation, faced with the effects of globalization, 
each State would by itself be in a much frailer position.
4. A post-national political entity
If it is true that both the EU’s politics and its imperfect democracy can 
and should be criticized; some criticisms, however, are based on 
assumptions, which ground in a national ontological principle: accord-
ing to this criticism, without a nation there can be no democracy. 
Another piece of criticism to the process of European construction 
derives from a fallacious assumption: it is deemed possible, in Euro-
pean politics, to regress and return to the supposed idyll of national 
sovereign States. Such a logic, which assumes the national State to be 
the ultimate political reference, not discerning what the EU’s reality is 
already, steps over the notion of a post-national political entity that to 
this moment is present only in the EU.
In this sense, Jürgen Habermas criticizes those who are favorable to 
the European construction being oriented by a national paradigm. Tra-
ditions, a common language, narratives, a common land, are not 
enough to legitimize a community; they assert Europe as a substantial 
cultural unit with which we can identify. Thus, regarding Germany, for 
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example, Habermas opposes all attempts to establish a collective iden-
tity based on tradition; to confer on the immediacy of language, of land, 
of shared narratives, the ability to legitimize a community means lim-
iting the concept of a community to “ethnos”, and not to “demos”. 
Now, ethnos denotes a group of individuals bound by residence, birth, 
language; demos, refers to a group, which is bound by a deliberate will 
to live together (that is, by what Rousseau called the “general will”). 
To Habermas, the European identity can only be that of a demos, a com-
munity of free, equal citizens, recognized as such through a true “social 
contract”: Europe will not be fulfilled through a cultivated or reacti-
vated tradition, but through a public space for discussion and deliber-
ation. It is therefore required for traditions and narratives to be exposed 
to doubt, to criticism, to public debate.
Thus Habermas argues that in the case of claims to truth or right-
ness, the speaker can redeem his guarantee discursively, that is, by 
adducing reasons: “In contexts of communication action, we call some-
one rational not only if he is able to put forward an assertion and, when 
criticized, to provide grounds for it by pointing to the appropriate evi-
dence, but also if he is following an established norm and is able, when 
criticized, to justify his action by explicating the situation in the light 
of legitimate expectations. We even call someone rational if he makes 
known a desire or an intention (…) etc., and is then able to reassure 
critics in regard to the revealed experience by drawing practical con-
sequences from it and behaving consistently thereafter” (Habermas, 
1981: I, 15). Man does not merely live in a socio-technical system, nor 
merely immerse in a vast economical system, but also integrated in a 
“life world” (Lebenswelt) – to return to a concept Habermas transposes 
form Husserl’s phenomenology. The “life world” is the environment 
in which meaning, values, aesthetical sensibility are elaborated, i.e. all 
that is beyond the merely functional imperatives of the systemic regu-
lations. This means that, for Habermas, the question of the European 
identity largely transcends the creation of a relatively uniform func-
tional space for mediatic practices.
It was Umberto Eco who remembered: “with the irruption of their 
languages, begins [...] the critical culture of Europe, which [...] begins to 
reflect on its own destiny as a multilingual civilization”, where coexist 
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“different narrative identities”, dense in agreement and disagreement 
(Ricoeur). Now, one of the models of identity-otherness integration is 
precisely the translation, which allows to raise the genius of the own 
language to the level of the foreign language (Humboldt), because “the 
language of Europe is the translation” (Umberto Eco). However, lan-
guages, common ground, traditions, are not enough: it is required that 
they be exposed to criticism, in a public space of discussion and delib-
eration, which makes for a “European patriotism” (Habermas), aiming 
at a growing post-national identity (Rocha, 2017: 214).
According to that paradigm, the current reality is that of a post-na-
tional Europe: if the European States remain the “masters of the Union”, 
the intergovernmental picture is articulated by a supranational instance 
– the guardian of the European interest –, which works as a network, 
in which sovereignty is shared in a conjunction of multiple levels and 
decisive instances. Now, the fallacy in this argumentation consists pre-
cisely on the impossibility, in relation to Europe, of an exclusively 
national focus; its supporters do not realize that the European road to 
democracy cannot be the same as the road of the national sovereign 
State, which, besides, is one of the criteria for democracy they them-
selves use to judge the EU.
Actually, europeization is something categorically different, which 
does not allow for the same logical form of thought. If the EU is formed 
by democratic States, then it is not in itself a State in the conventional 
sense: it is a Community of consensus and of right. This is followed by 
a new step which raises another question, connected with the previous 
one: the models of democracy developed for the modern State are not 
strictly applicable to the EU, or, at least, the democratic legitimation of 
the European policy should be assessed according to other models of 
democracy, now of a post-national nature, different from the canons 
which are confined to a strictly national logic.
Since these several levels, be it that of the dogmatic definition of the 
democratic criterion, be it that of the special historic way towards a 
democratization of Europe, still are undoubtedly unsatisfactory, one 
ends up being redirected to that nostalgic supposition that elevates that 
which is national to an absolute category. It is therefore important to 
notice, when the EU is the analytical object, how many are still 
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disserting moved by a languid yearning for the return to the suppos-
edly sovereign national State. According to Ulrich Beck, “we might 
question whether the models of democracy developed by the modern 
State are applicable to the EU or whether it would not be necessary to 
develop different, post-national models, in order to bestow upon Euro-
pean politics a democratic legitimacy”; that is what is called “the 
neo-national lie”. In this sense: “if we take the model of the Nation-state 
as an absolute reference, without recognizing the historic singularity 
of the European democratic process, which remains undeniably insuf-
ficient, it is due to a nostalgic lie that edifies the national fact in abso-
lute” (Beck, 2005: 55). Those who still think this way, remaining blinded 
by the nostalgic imagery of the sovereignty still found in private States, 
are completely unaware of this reality of a new political entity which is 
the EU. Today, it is no longer possible to return to the sovereign Nation-
state: the EU congregates sovereign States, which have unified, and 
share sovereignty to better respond to the new challenges before which 
the traditional sovereign State proves manifestly impotent. After 50 
years of europeization, both the states and societies are now able to act 
only in the European synthesis: for that very reason, they do not realize 
there are no more strongholds which are not imbued, whether visibly 
or not, with the “European spirit”.
5. Cosmopolitism and “complex sovereignty”
This idea is conceptually related to the deconstruction of the sover-
eignist doctrine of the modern State: the State is no longer seen as a 
hypostasis, and the novelty of the European construction is that of a 
political reality that surpasses and transforms the reality of national 
States and international organizations. The EU already corresponds in 
a considerable way, albeit in a singular beginning, to the criteria of 
cosmopolitical construction; we must therefore consider how we might 
analyze the EU in the light of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanism 
in the light of the EU.
European construction has been following a logic of integrating 
democracies, through consensus, free accession and recognition, with 
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no marks of constraint or force; this means that to the contractualist 
image underlying the State’s legitimacy (representing what all chose 
freely) is added the relative legitimacy which originates in the free 
accession of every people, internally organized in a democratic way, 
who do not set aside their own projects as a people, but who, through 
accession and cooperation, congregate with those who with them form 
a cosmopolitical network.
The EU’s democratic structures up to the present are insufficient, 
but they increasingly justify and attract the accession of European 
States. In the current situation, with many of the States forming a cos-
mopolitical union, the European national isolationist State, though 
democratic, will encounter significant difficulties to justify its position 
outside the cosmopolitical structure; in fact, as the present conjuncture 
shows it is imprudent for the Nation-state to refuse belonging to the 
proto-cosmopolitical European network. The reason is crucial: not only 
does the community structure guarantee certain individual rights, it 
also presents itself as a structure which guarantees the rights of Mem-
ber States and their respective peoples as collectivities. The logic of 
European integration therefore operates in a dialectic way or, should 
we prefer an empirical picture, through a cosmopolitical rainbow exte-
riorizing, little by little, through commitments and reciprocal steps. The 
Member States, by complying, are kept by means of a new political and 
legal stage, nobler than that of the democratic autism; it is the complex 
sovereignty, which is so called because the new challenges are won both 
in a greater number and in a better way through shared sovereignty 
than through the autist action of isolationist sovereignty.
Indeed, nowadays, many of the tasks which concern Europeans are 
global, and can no longer be solved in the restricted national setting: 
the rarefaction of energy sources, the destruction of the biosphere, the 
diffusion of epidemics, the volatility of financial markets, the interna-
tional migratory movements as a consequence of poverty situations or 
sudden political instability and, of course, the insecurity currently 
upsetting societies, from marginality strongholds to the new types of 
terrorism which have unleashed a sort of “war with no end in sight”. 
None of the states inherited from the past is in a position to guarantee 
the internal and external safety of its inhabitants: peace, freedoms, 
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well-being, socio-economical development, can no longer be main-
tained and prosper only in the setting of the States. Thus, in areas such 
as environmental protection or deregulation, that only prove generally 
beneficial if all adopt them, albeit powerful interests at the national 
level can effectively lobby to block, the EU has operated as an effective 
self-binding mechanism for tying the member states into mutually ben-
eficial policies (Bellamy, 2019: 117). In the 21st century, Europe can be 
vast and creative enough, influencing the arrangement of globalisation 
itself, which is currently deregulated.
It is, however, legitimate to state that the similarities concerning the 
principle of free accession, in both the USA and the EU, are enough to 
speak in both cases of federalism variants of democratic States. How-
ever, the principle of seeking a union among Nation-states through the 
mutual recognition of different national principles is new to Europe and 
the world, unique in its process, the bearer of a developing future. In 
the EU, the intervenients are already bound by a system of mutual 
dependencies, in a multifunctional and multilevel network (George 
and Bache, 2001: 19-29; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Morata, 2004), of 
which they could be freed only, were this possible, with extremely high 
costs (for both sides, as the Brexit process shows today). In other words, 
the old European national societies have risen, along with the national 
level, to another stage imbricated with it – that of the supranational 
instance, in such a way that the European spirit is already exercised in 
a multilevel circle – local and regional, national and supranational.
6. The European construction seeks its own new paradigm
It is, then, a principle of cosmopolitical and post-national construction, 
which implies a new kind of factor of cohesion and protection of 
democracy; in the EU, certain communitary and transnational habits 
are now added to the patriotic habits of the citizens of the States in 
Europe. We must yet add the most symptomatic, which configures a 
new stage of transnational solidarity (Cheneval, 2003: 208; Delors, 1992: 
61-110): the citizens of the different Member States of the EU have got 
used to participate in shared community solidarity regimes, a fact 
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which is politically auspicious: they accept that a part of their taxes be 
spent in projects for infra-structures in other Member States, in the 
setting of structural funds and cohesion funds. Furthermore, they are 
willing to accept that those issuing from other Member States have the 
right to live, work and vote in their countries; and those who settle 
themselves in another European country are ready to accept the duty 
of respecting the ways of this country and of learning the respective 
language.
In the case of the EU, it is, therefore, a variant which displays another 
dimension of cosmopolitism. This is not mistaken with traditional 
immigration, considering the moment of reciprocity, which is seen 
there: there is no predominant culture, which absorbs all others and 
dictates the rules and terms; there is a trade and interchange among 
several cultures, following the principle of mutual recognition. The 
effects of this cosmopolitanism are already so strong that we sometimes 
take no notice of them. Thus, the European individual is about to 
become, in what concerns the reality of States and the supranational 
European instance, the first holder of an overlapping citizenship – the 
European citizenship.
Furthermore, the EU achieves that cosmopolitanism because it cul-
minates the national imperative of fulfilling the human rights through 
a relational and reciprocate European structure of regimes committed 
to the defense of rights, both political and social. All this is a part of a 
transnational political culture, which is starting to settle, a kind of vir-
tuous circle between national legislation, European politics and trans-
national democratic habits, based on the subsidiarity principle.
This principle is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as 
closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made as 
to whether action at Community level is justified in the light of the 
possibilities available at national, regional or local level; specifically, it 
is the principle whereby the Union does not take action (except in the 
areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless it is more effec-
tive than action taken at national, regional or local level. It is closely 
bound up with the principles of proportionality and necessity, which 
require that any action by the Union should not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty (Symes, Levy and 
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Littlewood, 1997). In fact, the Edinburgh European Council of Decem-
ber 1992 defined the basic principles underlying subsidiarity and laid 
down guidelines for interpreting Article 5, which enshrines subsidiar-
ity in the EU Treaty; its conclusions were set out in a declaration that 
still serves as the cornerstone of the subsidiarity principle. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam has taken up the approach that follows from this decla-
ration in a Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality annexed to the EC Treaty. Two of the things this 
Protocol introduces are the systematic analysis of the impact of legis-
lative proposals on the principle of subsidiarity and the use, where 
possible, of less binding Community measures. The Treaty of Lisbon 
provides for the strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity, in par-
ticular through the obligation for the Union institutions to inform 
national parliaments at all stages of the legislative process (Rocha, 2003: 
214-223). The establishment of an early warning system on compliance 
with the principle of subsidiarity also allows national parliaments to 
request the Commission to review a legislative proposal if it considers 
that it violates the principle.
The European citizens are not simply more patriotic concerning 
national republicanism, but the bearers of community democratic habits, 
indicators of a European patriotism (Habermas, 1998: 132, 225-226), which 
is emerging. It is also on this level that education should play a primor-
dial role, in the sense of increasing the habits and the conscience of Euro-
pean belonging, developing what Ferry calls an ethical substance of the 
post-national (Ferry, 2000: 52-60, 161-181); to sum up, to an education for 
citizenship, today is added in the European context the challenge of find-
ing forms and contents for forming the European citizen.
Despite the sluggishness of its steps and the slowness of the pro-
cesses, the European construction does not represent a search for the 
“lost time”, but constantly seeks its own new paradigm. That is what 
Julien Benda wrote in his book Speech to the European Nation, a work the 
Nazis wanted to destroy, but is still inspiring: “I say that building 
Europe is above all a question of moral [...]. It is about exhorting men 
not to destroy nations, but to feel instead in a region by themselves 
transcendent to national feeling” (Benda, 1933: 14, 58). It is precisely 
what we call European culture that inscribes us in the nation while at 
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the same time transcending national feeling. The European unity can-
not therefore be seen as a national unity. The hypothesis is that this 
dualism, which is antinomian in the EU, is positively solved through 
a transformation of the State’s substantiality, by subsuming that third 
dimension which we call cosmopolitical.
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